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10-6651

29 AUG 1958

**The Honorable Richard B. Russell**  
**United States Senate**  
**Washington 25, D. C.**

**Dear Senator Russell:**

It was a pleasure to appear before the CIA Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee on 8 August. I believe it important that this Subcommittee be briefed periodically both on activities of the Agency and generally on world affairs and the Soviet military posture in particular.

At the August 8 meeting you raised a number of questions concerning the Agency. These questions were based on complaints taken from a memorandum furnished to the Subcommittee by a former employee of the Agency. I agreed with your view that it was the duty of the Subcommittee to raise questions of this type. I welcome them. At that time I stated that the substance of these complaints and charges was not true. In some instances I responded more specifically to the points as they were raised. At this time I would like to take the opportunity of answering those points of criticism which we noted.

a. It was charged that project outlines, if any were drawn, were extremely vague and rarely, if ever, discussed with the agent.

Project outlines are a basic part of Agency doctrine concerning project management. This doctrine has been developed and improved over the years and is still the subject of continuing study. In training courses the proper use of project outlines is stressed, based on experience gained through actual operations. Project outlines are carefully prepared and reviewed at several echelons of command for completeness, consistency, security, feasibility, cost and responsiveness to requirements. These outlines over the years have been an essential element of project management. Whether a project outline is to be discussed with the agent would be a matter depending on the circumstances of the case. An agent, for security reasons,

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must not know more than he needs to know of the details of a project of which he is a part. In many situations it would be most inappropriate to discuss the details of a project outline with an agent, particularly where the agent who is not a regular Agency staff employee is only a small part of a large project.

b. It was charged that there was scant or no briefing for agents and agents were required to read Handbook for Spies by Alexander Foots with an instruction to destroy after reading although it is published in a 25¢ paperback edition.

Careful briefing of agents is an essential element in the conduct of operations. A great deal of effort has been devoted to this phase of operations. The Handbook for Spies has been on the list of suggested reading for students in training courses for many years. However, it is only one of many books on the subject which are suggested reading. As to the instruction to destroy, it should be pointed out that if the individual were to operate in a foreign country as a legitimate businessman or under other cover but were in fact an agent, it might well be inappropriate to have a collection of books on espionage in his possession.

25X1 c. There was a charge of grossly inadequate training at [redacted] It was charged that the thirty-day course resulted in a high percentage of the trainees quitting. It was further charged that only one out of seven instructors had ever been in the field.

25X1 For over-all training program and particularly the operations training [redacted] is, I believe, a well conceived and executed program. 25X1 [redacted]

25X1 It is basic policy that the instructors in operations courses are rotated from the operating elements to make available the latest experiences in the field. At the present time, without exception, all instructors in the operations courses have had field experience with the Agency and, in fact, nine of the 18 instructors have been Chiefs of Stations, or of Bases, abroad. At the first running of the operations course at [redacted] it is true that only one of the total of seven instructors for that course had field experience with the Agency although some of them had had intelligence experience in the field with other agencies of the Government. This situation was rapidly changed in line with the policy mentioned above. The other charges are completely false.

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d. There was a charge of general lack of language qualifications and a specific charge relating to the [REDACTED]

I believe that the Central Intelligence Agency has the finest language program of any agency in Government. Over the years we have developed and improved this program, recognizing the need for our people to know the language of the area in which they are to be stationed. Our language training is conducted not only internally but we also utilize the facilities of [REDACTED]

Approximately two years ago the Agency introduced a program of incentives to develop language qualifications on an over-all basis. This language development program is at this time unique in Government. A brief summary of this program is enclosed for information. Of course, the requirements of various assignments throughout the world will on occasion be such that the language facility of the available personnel will not be the best possible so that there may well be spot situations where improvement can be made. In the specific case mentioned, the Chief and Deputy Chief had a working knowledge of the language when they were assigned to the Station and during their stay developed a considerable degree of fluency.

e. The charges of laxity of inspection and the fact that the Inspector General had no jurisdiction over the matter of accounting for funds is completely false.

The Inspector General has complete authority to look into any matter within the Agency and make appropriate recommendations to me. The Inspector General on a regular basis dispatches members of his staff to field stations for inspections and frequently he personally travels in the field. In addition to the Inspector General, I should like to point out that in the field of accounting for funds a large percentage of our funds are accountable on the same basis as funds in any other Government agency and thus are subject to audit by the General Accounting Office. As to our other funds, called Confidential Funds, they are initially audited in a manner similar to that of the General Accounting Office by the audit section of our Finance Division. Subsequently, these funds are audited by the staff of the CIA auditor on an independent basis with reports made directly to me. In addition to these facilities there is an Inspection and Review Staff in the largest operating component which investigates and examines operational activities on an independent basis within that component. As a matter of information,

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the method and extent of critical self-examination within the Agency has been favorably commented upon by the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities.

f. The charge of arbitrary use of termination authority by the Director of Central Intelligence and the perfunctory performance of Review Boards is not true. This authority is exercised with a great deal of care and in the overwhelming number of cases an Employment Review Board is constituted with senior officials of the Agency to conduct hearings and make recommendations to the Director of Central Intelligence. These Boards hold extensive hearings with the individual concerned appearing before the Board to present his case. Since the establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency, this authority has been exercised in 48 cases, an average of less than five per year.

g. The charge of threats to employees if malfeasance were to be revealed is simply false. We could not and would not permit such a situation to exist and I know of no case where this has occurred.

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It is hoped that the above will be of assistance to the Subcommittee and if further details are desired on any point, I shall be pleased to supply them. I do not intend to convey the impression that the Central Intelligence Agency and its personnel are perfect. We have made some errors in the past and no doubt will make other errors in the future but as we gain experience we are constantly improving and will continue to improve.

Sincerely,

Signed

Allen W. Dulles  
Director

Enclosure

CONCURRENCES:

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Acting **Inspector General**

22 AUG 1958

Date

/s/ Thomas Karamessines

A/ **Deputy Director (Plans)**

22 AUG

Date

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D/ **Director of Security**

22 AUG 1958

Date

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D/ **Director of Training**

22 AUG 1958

Date

*Concur  
CPC  
DDCT*

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